Over the past two weeks, we have introduced the idea that market-based logics have become more common in the management of natural resources, whether we consider this in terms of Ecosystem Services or the privatization of water resources. This tendency is consistent with what many social theorists refer to as neoliberalism, or “a theory of political-economic practices that proposes human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey 2005: 2). Indeed, over the past several decades, many systems for managing natural resources have been characterized by a valorization of market exchange and private property as the keys to effective resource stewardship.

Neoliberalism can take many forms. Dominant forms include valuation (wherein complex ecosystems and other entities previously considered invaluable are given economic values through pricing) and privatization (wherein natural resources, including those long held in trust by regional, state, or municipal authorities, are turned over to firms or individuals as private property). Neoliberalism is also associated with a tendency to eliminate regulations or restrictions on capital accumulation; to privatize services previously provided by the state; to reinforce strong property rights; to create new commodities; and to eliminate social safety nets (like Medicaid, welfare, or previously redistributed taxes and benefits). Our goal this week is to think more deeply about these tendencies as they apply to the management of ocean resources, focusing on privatization as a response to overfishing dilemmas.

Ocean fisheries pose a genuine management dilemma: fish are mobile and thus difficult to enclose (or put boundaries around), difficult to count, and difficult to police. These dynamics have contributed to high levels of overfishing globally. Historically, states have attempted to manage this challenge (and ensure the capture of fishery benefits) by enacting various laws and regulations associated with the management of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). These zones establish state control from 3 nautical miles to 200 off the shore of most coasts. As Mansfield discusses, this puts about 95% of all fish catch under public property regimes, giving the state the right to distribute access to these spaces (this is a move similar to the establishment of state control over protected areas).

As your film for the week discusses, however, many state regulations have not been effective in reducing overfishing (and state regulations have in some cases exacerbated overfishing). This has led some critics to argue that fisheries remain imperiled under state management and that privatization is necessary to successfully manage fish resources. Enter the idea of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). ITQs create a property regime allocating fish catch among different users. Per this scheme, fishers can catch their allocated amount or lease and sell their quota to other fishers; the quota, in other words, becomes a commodity and form of private property they control. As the argument goes, this will resolve the issue of overfishing both by capping the overall catch and by encouraging the least efficient vessels to exit the fishery voluntarily (i.e. by selling or leasing their quota).

As you read Mansfield’s article and watch this week’s film, try to think about whether or not this solves the underlying issues driving overfishing and about what types of new problems ITQs may introduce. Do you agree or disagree with ITQs as an approach to managing overfishing? What are some of the pros and cons that you see in the case of the cod fishery presented in your film for the week?